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Can groups hold, revise and reject beliefs? Are collective doxastic attitudes 
reducible to what is believed by individual members or do they presuppose 
some additional joint commitment? How can we resist the sway of social 
stereotypes when assessing others as moral and intellectual agents? Are 
emotions always a hindrance to epistemic goals and is the apparent conser-
vatism of scientifi c groups indeed a deviation from usual collective behav-
ior? Departing from analytic epistemology’s traditional focus on individual 
agents who operate in something akin to a social vacuum, this volume ex-
plores the epistemic features of group agency. Its contributors inquire, for 
instance, to what extent collective processes of attaining and revising beliefs 
can be equated with their individual counterparts, and whether belonging 
to a particular intellectual environment can generate morally corrosive 
prejudice. The volume consists of four thematic clusters concerning episte-
mology as such, moral epistemology (understood as the practice of attaining 
beliefs about actions related to morally valuable outcomes), politics and sci-
ence. However, portraying the work as a handbook one should recommend 
to a novice would—despite its stated introductory aim—be somewhat mis-
leading, as it presupposes considerable familiarity with prior discussions on 
testimony, epistemic injustice, deliberative democracy, assertion, Kuhnian 
philosophy of science, and like. The actual importance of certain articles, 
such as Miranda Fricker’s apt revision of the overly optimistic approach 
to implicit biases she had argued for in her earlier works, can only be fully 
appreciated if one is well-acquainted with recent trends in social epistemol-
ogy. Taken as a whole, nonetheless, The Epistemic Life of Groups presents 
the reader with a range of engaging topics that merit further attention. For 
the love of simplicity, I will remain true to the volume’s structure in offering 
brief comments on each essay.
Epistemology. Sandorf Goldberg opens the fi rst section with the claim that 
criteria for considering an assertion proper depend on the intellectual com-
munity under whose auspices it is uttered. Within the context of some con-
versational group riddled with such pervasive disagreement that hopes for 
attaining knowledge dwindle, assertions are proper as long as they serve 
the group’s informational purposes and can be reasonably expected to be 
understood by other members. Although Goldberg intends to preserve 
the propriety of philosophical discourse despite the community’s continu-
ous dissent on central issues, his immediate acceptance of contextualism 
seems the overlook the stronger case that philosophical assertions often 
hinge on objective standards—such as logical validity in narrowly theoreti-
cal domains and congruence with experimental fi ndings when discussions 
veer closer to cognitive and social science—which render certain statements 
more pertinent to knowledge than others. Instead of exonerating philosoph-
ical discourse, this decision to trade the more demanding epistemic norms 
of knowledge or empirical adequacy for reasonable in-group intelligibility 
forces us to concede that collectives which are usually considered epistemi-
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cally irresponsible—such as science deniers or conspiracy theorists—actu-
ally do satisfy a more forbearing epistemic norm, given that their assertions 
are entirely in sync with other members.
Miranda Fricker proceeds with a sensible review of her work on epis-
temic injustice and recognizes that individuals are seldom able to fully 
overcome the biases they had internalized by growing up in a prejudiced 
society. To what extent, then, to these cognitive constrains pardon us from 
blame for wrongful epistemic conduct? Although implicit biases—as they 
run counter to our consciously held values and therefore cannot be consid-
ered intentional—aren’t conventionally culpable, this falls short of excusing 
our behavior. Making use of Bernard Williams’ defi nition of agent-regret as 
the appropriate response of someone who had experienced a case of moral 
bad luck, Fricker argues that otherwise conscientious perpetrators of epis-
temic injustice should regret their misconduct, refl ect upon their prejudiced 
beliefs and encourage institutional measures which will prevent their peers 
from repeating similar mistakes.
After this brief foray into practical concerns, Hans Schmid wonders 
whether group self-knowledge is as groundless (meaning, as automatic and 
as non-inferential) as its individual counterpart. Albeit he fi rst shows that 
Anscombe’s criteria for individual intentionality—namely, fi rst-person iden-
tity, perspective, commitment, and authority—aren’t intuitively compatible 
with the collective model, Schmid ends up concluding that genuine group 
belonging does require a strong sense of joint commitment and identifi cation 
which render the idea of groundless group self-knowledge sensible (72).
Ethics. In the volume’s fi rst essay on moral epistemology, Elizabeth 
Anderson offers a rich account of how social moral learning—the collec-
tive acquisition of true beliefs about our ethical duties to others—may be 
obstructed if we indulge in sanitized interpretations of historical injus-
tice. When entire communities agree on self-laudatory narratives of their 
previous moral excellence—which Anderson illustrates with the fact that 
slavery wasn’t abolished due to the autodidactic moral learning of Western 
intellectuals, but, instead, because subalterns continuously sought human 
rights—they fail to acknowledge that only the disadvantaged have substan-
tial epistemic access to the urgency of their problems (78). The historical 
facts that whites fi rst envisioned a gradual abolition of slavery that would 
take decades and then offered freed blacks unlivable wages for working the 
same fi elds they had previously occupied as slaves make the problem quite 
salient. What Anderson appeals for is a kind of epistemic democracy where-
in moral progress requires those in privileged social positions to recognize 
the humanity of their interlocutors and to, when crafting policy, take their 
experiences into account on terms of equality.
Michael Brady follows up with the original claim that emotions—both in-
dividual and group—can have epistemic value inasmuch as they direct our 
attention towards certain events and compel us to appraise whether they 
had warranted such an emotional response, thus promoting understanding. 
Arguing that individual emotions amount to group counterparts through 
emotional contagion and affective conformity, Brady concludes that shared 
dismay with social events makes groups inquire about what is indeed going 
on and, consequently, may encourage greater transparency from governing 
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bodies (109). He does note, however, that misinformed group emotions can 
cause severe epistemic harm and hence require situational assessments.
Next up, Glen Pettigrove wonders whether the propositional model of 
revising beliefs within groups can explain how moral communities change 
complex opinions with holistic content (121). Heavily drawing on Margaret 
Gilbert’s collective epistemology, he uses the example of the Presbyterian 
Church to show that revisions of moral knowledge do not arise when mem-
bers merely replace one proposition with another, but instead require shifts 
in comprehensive—or holistic—moral doctrines.
Politics. Fabienne Peter inquires whether democracy can be justifi ed in 
the light of its epistemic value alone, rather than by appealing to practical 
concerns. Simply put, if we can resolve political matters by making a correct 
decision, presupposing that there is an objectively correct choice to be made, 
then democracy is legitimate inasmuch as its decision-making procedures 
reliably produce such outcomes. The problem here lies in what she calls 
“the authority dilemma” (134). As long as there is a relevant third-person 
authority—say, an expert in some fi eld—who is particularly knowledgeable 
about a matter of collective interest, aggregating the opinions of compara-
tive laypeople will not seem like an advisable route to social policy. Peter 
fi rst presents a case for deliberative democracy, which stresses the impor-
tance of exchanging reasons and acknowledging plural perspectives by way 
of public debate, in place of mere aggregation or majority voting. Next up, 
assuming that certain questions—such as highly contested, theoretical and 
ideologically laden issues—do not entail a procedure-independent truth, she 
concludes that the deliberative process is in itself epistemically valuable be-
cause it sensitizes agents to different opinions. This line of reasoning leads 
to the obvious conclusion that we should only entrust decision-making to 
democratic collectives in matters lacking an objective third-person author-
ity (149). What remains to be explored is the precise domain of such purely 
subjective topics. Peter’s portrayal of minimum wage policies as a subject 
that—although it is undoubtedly a matter of public dissent—requires no 
expert knowledge could be contested, so future discussions might benefi t 
from a more careful distinction.
Stephanie Collins and Holly Lawford-Smith proceed by inquiring about 
the transfer of duties between individuals and states. This process, in their 
view, includes several epistemic components: individual members recognize 
their country in compelling it to discharge duties on their behalf, the state 
acknowledges its individual members by distributing smaller duties (such 
as taxes), members intentionally participate by fulfi lling their obligations 
and both parties engage in bidirectional transfers of knowledge concern-
ing their ethical demands (160). Individuals are, moreover, only justifi ed in 
transferring their duties to the state if they can reasonably believe that it 
will truly act on their behalf. 
In the fi nal essay on politics, Kay Spiekermann turns to behavioral eco-
nomics in explaining how agents tend to ignore—or distort—readily avail-
able evidence about the ethical opacity of their actions. Having identifi ed 
four types of “moral wriggle room” (182) wherein agents deliberately avoid 
facts which entail moral obligations, convince themselves that moral norms 
are more lenient than might seem or deceive others about the scope of their 
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rights, Spiekermann locates them in discriminatory practices of “white ig-
norance.” In this sense, whites tend to embrace faulty beliefs (such as the 
stances that freed black slaves had equal opportunities to whites or that 
black communities are only marginally disadvantaged) which diminish nor-
mative constraints on their behavior. Spiekermann does imply, however, 
that encouraging agents to voice their ethical values—and thus identify 
with them—can eliminate self-serving biases by rendering cognitive dis-
sonance more explicit. Echoing Fricker’s work on internalized prejudice, he 
concludes the essay by admitting that “it remains unclear whether training 
individuals to resist self-serving biases can succeed” (188).
Philosophy of science. James Owen Weatherall and Margaret Gilbert intro-
duce the fi nal section by combining Gilbert’s seminal work on joint commit-
ment and Thomas Kuhn’s description of “normal science” (203). Arguing 
that group membership imposes certain responsibilities on its members, 
including a heightened sense of identifi cation with the collective and a dis-
regard for outliers’ opinions, they use this joint account to show that the 
string theory community’s “unusually” dogmatic behavior in contemporary 
physics only serves to confi rm Gilbert’s model. The upshot here is that the 
apparent epistemic irresponsibility of scientifi c communities—assuming 
that propensities to dismiss all opposing evidence and believe desirable re-
sults without checking don’t live up to most methodological standards—
isn’t an occasional deviation from proper conduct, but a natural feature of 
joint commitment. This conclusion may serve as a sound basis for exploring 
common constraints on scientifi c progress.
Torsten Wilholt closes the volume by attempting to locate the source 
of trustworthiness in collaborative scientifi c research. The problem here is 
how one can assess whether a scientifi c collective is worthy of trust without 
appealing to traditional indicators of reliability such as institutional repu-
tation. Noting that the social organization of scientifi c work has become so 
diffuse that it is almost impossible to attribute trust by employing previous 
track records, Wilholt argues that researchers can rely on shared method-
ological standards (229). The choice of a particular methodology, moreover, 
usually entails a trade-off between the reliability out its results—both posi-
tive and negative—and its power, or the number of generated results. Given 
that the dilemma between a small number of accurate results and more 
fecund, but less reliable research cannot be resolved by appealing to truth, 
researchers ought to attune their choices to the gravity of the matter at 
hand (233).
Regardless of the breadth of covered topics and the considerable quality 
of individual essays, the volume is better described as a compilation of dif-
ferent approaches to both collective epistemic agents and their individual 
members, than as a comprehensive introduction into collective epistemol-
ogy. Having said this, an informed reader will surely fi nd Fricker’s and 
Brady’s editorial work deserving of close philosophical scrutiny, and we can 
hope that this new territory will generate fruitful developments in the do-
main of collective and social epistemology.
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